The recent proliferation of mobile computing has given rise to vehicular social networks (VSNs) which use the Internet of Vehicles and social networks as the main design elements. As one of the most critical components in VSNs, location sharing plays an important role in helping vehicles share information and strengthen their social bonds. This, however, may compromise vehicles' privacy, including location information and social relationship details. Some solutions have been proposed to address these challenges. However, none of them considers privacy of inter-user threshold distance, which effectively can be used to identify vehicles, their friends, and location information, by malicious or undesired elements of the system. In order to overcome this limitation, we propose a secure distance comparison protocol. Furthermore, we present a privacy-preserving location-sharing scheme in VSNs, namely PPLS, which allows vehicles to build more complex access control policies. The safety of our scheme is validated by the security analysis, and experimental results demonstrate the efficiency of PPLS scheme.
Introduction
With the fast development & deployment of mobile computing, vehicular ad hoc networks have become important data transmission platforms and greatly promote the realization of Intelligent Transport System (ITS). Recently, the application goal of vehicular ad hoc networks [1] transforms from simply improving the safety of road traffic and the efficiency of transportation to vehicular social networks (VSNs), which deeply integrates the Internet of Vehicles (IoVs) [2] and social networks. Through VSNs, vehicles can experience more comprehensive services.
VSNs can provide various services [3, 4] , including location-based services (LBSs). In LBSs, geographical locations of vehicles are exploited to provide information and entertainment services, since the location of a vehicle usually represents its contextual information [5] . As millions of applications based on LBSs are available, vehicles can easily obtain information such as restaurants, hotels, etc. In fact, as a fundamental component of VSNs, LBSs have become increasingly popular and important.
While enjoying the convenience of location-based services, the privacy threats should not be ignored [6] . Especially after some research work [7, 8, 9] revealing horrifying security and privacy issues which have caused serious public concerns.
In LBSs, users are expected to update their real-time location information and share it for better services. However, disclosing the location information is dangerous, since an adversary can track an individual and infer his/her preferences.
This threat becomes more serious in VSNs as vehicles' location can be correlated with their profiles [10] . Hence, it is essential to protect vehicles' location privacy [11, 12, 13] in VSNs.
To address these problems, a series of research works have been performed.
A MobiShare system was presented by Wei et al. [14] , allowing users to share location information flexibly. Inspired by [14] , Shen et al. [15, 16] proposed a system called N-Mobishare. Li et al. [17] proposed MobiShare+ which reduces the security risk of MobiShare. In 2016, Liu et al. [18] provided a system called BMobishare. Recently, Li et al. [19] proposed a more secure location-sharing scheme. The aforementioned systems support two kinds of queries, i.e., friends' queries and strangers' queries, and also satisfy access control policy. Aside from all listed above, [20, 21, 22 ] also provide efficient way for key management which bring support for cryptographic solutions.
However, these mechanisms are not perfect. Firstly, the threshold distance is a personal preference of each vehicle (to establish a social circle), but this is used as public information for location service entities in the system. When the threshold distance set by a vehicle is a special number, or the threshold distances set for different targets are in a special data group, the adversary can track the data or data group to identify vehicles. Secondly, threshold distance is used by a vehicle to determine with whom they are willing to share locations.
Some schemes use broadcast encryption to share personal location information, which violates the distance-based access control policy. Finally, it is far from actual application requirements that all systems mentioned above use a single threshold distance for all friends. Vehicles may wish to set different threshold distances for different friends.
Our contributions: Motivated by these issues, we propose a privacypreserving location-sharing scheme in VSNs, namely PPLS. The contributions are described as follows.
(1) In previous research, a vehicle can only set a single threshold distance for all friends. However, this setting does not meet the actual needs. To improve the practicability of the system, our scheme allows vehicles to set different threshold distances for different friends. In our scheme, vehicles can use a more flexible strategy to achieve access control.
(2) Since existing works do not consider the privacy of the threshold distance, an adversary can easily collect threshold distances to get more personal information of vehicles. To overcome this defect, we propose a new secure distance comparison protocol to execute encrypted distance comparison and prevent location servers from determining this sensitive data.
(3) Based on the proposed secure distance comparison protocol, we propose the PPLS scheme. In PPLS, vehicles are allowed to set different threshold distances for different friends, and broadcast encryption is not used, while diverse queries are used for information retrieval. This paper is organized in the following sections. In Section 2, we provide the system models and design goals. In Section 3, we present the building blocks including the proposed secure distance comparison protocol. Section 4 introduces the PPLS scheme and Section 5 gives its security analysis. In Section 6, performance analysis is provided. Finally, we draw a conclusion in Section 7.
System Models and Design Goals
This section presents the formal system architecture, system work flows, and the threat model for location privacy. We also identify and list the security goals for the proposed scheme.
System Architecture
The system architecture is depicted in Figure 1 where four main entities interact with each other.
Vehicles. The vehicles of VSNs, can communicate with roadside units (RSUs) directly. They can get their own locations from GPS and request for locations of specific friends, nearby friends and strangers.
RSUs. After RSUs receive requests from vehicles, they forward them towards the social network server, then return the received responses to vehicles. Vehicles may submit three types of queries: 1) request for particular friends' locations, 2) request for nearby friends' locations, and 3) request for nearby strangers' locations.
Social network server (SNS

System Workflows
In light of the proposed architecture, five main workflows are defined.
(1) Vehicles must initially register with SNS for location based service. The registration process requires submitting personal identification information and make effective proof of authenticity. Moreover, vehicles must also define their access control policies. SNS maintains a database and processes vehicles' personal information. SNS registers all vehicles with the LS, using pseudo-identities and initial location information.
(2) When arriving at a new place or after a specified time period, vehicles need to update their information. In this regard, SNS maintains the new relationships and threshold distances of vehicles, whereas LSs maintain the new location information.
(3) When a vehicle intends to obtain the location of a friend, they submit a query for that particular vehicle. If the requester meets the access control policies of their friends, they can obtain the location information.
(4) When a vehicle intends to obtain nearby friends current location information, they submit a query for friends within certain distance. If the vehicle meets the access control policies of these required friends, they can get the desired information.
(5) In case of a vehicle requiring nearby stranger's current location, they submit a query for strangers within specific distance. If the vehicle meets the access control policy of strangers (within distance), they can get the locations of these strangers.
Threat Model
Out of the listed entities (i.e. vehicles, SNS, & LSs), vehicles are considered to be dishonest. This means that they may try to access the server they do not have the permission to access, and find the location of a target vehicle.
Moreover, we assume that SNS and LSs are honest but curious, i.e., they will follow the scheme formally, but try to obtain as much sensitive information as possible. For example, SNS may want to find the location of vehicles, and LSs may want to obtain sensitive information of vehicles. We suppose that SNS and LSs may be compromised by an adversary, but not at the same time. This means that SNS and LSs will not collude with each other. The assumption is reasonable since it is extremely difficult for an adversary to control the two servers at the same time.
Security Goals
Using the defined threat model as guiding principle, the security goals for location-sharing system are defined as below:
(1) The system should protect vehicles' location information from SNS and other unauthorized vehicles. Vehicles' locations cannot be leaked to friends or strangers who do not satisfy the predefined access policy.
(2) SNS provides social relationships related service and should not be able to determine (directly or indirectly) the vehicle locations.
(3) Location servers provide location-based services and should not know vehicles' social network information and/or identity information.
Building Blocks
The main challenge to solve is to implement location-based services while preserving vehicles' privacy. In the proposed Privacy Preserving Location Sharing (PPLS) scheme, the vehicle sets threshold distances for different friends & strangers, and the threshold values may vary with different targets. It is important to note that, these values may indicate personal emotion tendency towards different targets, and location service providers can collect this data to infer such personal information. Therefore, the threshold distance should be kept private in addition to actual location. To solve this problem, we propose a secure distance comparison protocol based on Paillier encryption. The scheme also makes use of RSA encryption, which is elaborated in a nutshell for comparative understanding.
RSA Encryption
RSA encryption is a widely used public-key cryptosystem for secure data transmission, where a public and private key pair is used for encryption and decryption. The process is summarized as:
Choose two large prime numbers p and q, compute n = pq. Select random integer e such that 1 < e < λ(n) and gcd(e, λ(n)) = 1, where λ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1), and gcd is the greatest common divisor.
The public key is (n, e) and the private key is (p, q, d).
Encryption. Assume that M is a message to encrypt. First, turn M (un-padded plain text) into an integer m(padded plain text) by padding scheme. The ciphertext is c = m e (modn).
Decryption. Let c be the ciphertext to decrypt, m can be recovered by comput-
The plain text message M can be recovered by reversing the padding scheme.
Paillier encryption
Paillier public-key cryptosystem is a classical homomorphic semantically secure public-key cryptosystem, and is used in proposed secure distance comparison protocol. This section outlines the basic technique of Paillier public-key cryptosystem.
Choose two large prime numbers p and q, and compute n = pq. Select
, and lcm is the lowest common multiple. The public key is (n, g) and the private key is (p, q).
Encryption. Assume that m is a message to be encrypted where 0 ≤ m ≤ n. Select random r < n, then the ciphertext is c = g m · r n mod n 2 .
Decryption. Let c be the ciphertext to decrypt, where c ∈ Z * n 2 , the plain text message is m =
mod n.
Paillier public-key cryptosystem has the following properties.
Homomorphic addition of plain texts. We can give the value of E(m 1 + m 2 ) through E(m 1 ) and E(m 2 ) without knowing m 1 and m 2 .
Homomorphic multiplication of plain texts. We can give the value of E(m 1 m 2 ) through E(m 1 ) and m 2 without knowing m 1 .
Secure Distance Comparison Protocol
In our system, LSs need to compare the distance between two vehicles with the corresponding threshold distance to effectively provide services. To preserve vehicles' privacy, we propose a secure distance comparison protocol (as shown in Protocol 1) based on [23] and [24] . Let d threshold be threshold distance, g be a generator of a cyclic group M , and d actual be the actual distance. We set Let c ← P E pkm (d threshold g; r). SNS sends (pk m , c) to LS;
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, LS computes c and send c to SNS;
Otherwise output FALSE.
Privacy-preserving Location-sharing (PPLS) Scheme
In order to preserve the vehicles' location and social network privacy, the scheme utilizes encryption keys generated by different system entities. The details of each step are given below, and Registration: When a vehicle u i with an identifier ID intends to use the system's services, they need to register with the SNS first. Registration is in the form of (ID, C pks (x i , y i ), C pks (pk u ), F list, (df i,1 , df i,2 , ..., ds), ts, Sig(ID, ts)), where C pks (x i , y i ) and C pks (pk u ) are u i 's location & public key (respectively) encrypted by LS's public key, F list is u i 's friend list, df i,1 is u i 's threshold distance for friend u 1 within which they are willing to share location with u 1 , ds is the threshold distance for strangers with which u i is willing to reveal its location to strangers, ts is a time stamp, and Sig (ID, ts) is a signature generated on ts.
SNS holds a database to save vehicles' threshold distances.
SNS confirms the request. If the signature is valid, SNS generates a registration request to LS. The request is in the form of (P ID, C pks (x, y) , C pks (pk u ) , tl), in which P ID is u i 's pseudo-identity generated by AES (ID, rt) and rt is a random value. tl is the time limit for which the record will be held. LSs can timely remove the expired data and reduce storage overhead. The value of tl should be set slightly larger than the update cycle.
Update: For each time period t, vehicles need to update their information.
Similar to the registration content, each vehicle sends a message to SNS in the form of (ID, C pks (x, y) , C pks (pk u ) , F list, (df i,1 , df i,2 , ..., ds), ts, Sig(ID, ts)), where C pks (x, y), F list and (df i,1 , df i,2 , ..., ds) represent vehicle's new location encrypted by LS's public key, new friendship, and new threshold distances. Without updating pk u , the adversary can associate the vehicle's P IDs by tracing pk u . If the signature is valid, SNS sends (P ID, C pks (x, y) , C pks (pk u ) , tl) to LSs. LSs save related information in their database.
Request for particular friends: If a vehicle u i with an identifier ID
wants to obtain the location(s) of their friend(s) (f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f M ), u i submits a query for friends' locations in the form of (ID, C pks (x i , y i ),pf ,(
to SNS, where pf represents the request type. To handle this request, SNS first recovers the pseudo-identity P ID = (P ID 1 , P ID 2 , . . . , P ID M ) corresponding to (f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f M ). Then, SNS randomly divides P ID into Q subsets P (c 1,i , c 2,i , . . . , c N,i ) = (P E pkm (df 1,i g; r 1 ), P E pkm (df 2,i g; r 2 ), . . . , P E pkm (df N,i g, r N )), and sends (P ID, C pks (x i , y i ),pf ,P j ID , (c 1,i , c 2,i , . . . , c N,i ) , pk m ) to LS j , where LS j is the jth location server in LSs. After receiving the request, LS j performs the following steps:
(1) Decrypt C pks (x i , y i ) to get u i 's current location (x i , y i ).
(2) Calculate the distances between u i and its friends, and save as (
(3) Choose parameters s and r . For c 1,i , calculate (1) Decrypt C pks (x i , y i ) to get u i 's current location (x i , y i ).
(2) Calculate the distances between u i and all of their friends, and save as
(3) Choose parameters s and r . For c 1,i , calculate 
Assuming a stranger u 2 is within l distance away from u i . u 2 's location is (x 2 , y 2 ) and u 2 's threshold distance for strangers is ds 2 . If and only if dis(u i , u 2 ) < ds 2 , LS j returns u 2 's encrypted location to SNS. SNS then sends the final result to u i .
Security Analysis
The security analysis is provided based on the threat model and security goals. In PPLS, we assume that SNS and LSs. Hence, they do not collude with each other, and are not compromised by the adversary at the same time.
Access control. PPLS allows vehicles to set different threshold distances for different targets. Since SNS and LSs are assumed to be honest but curious, they will follow the protocol formally. That means, only the vehicles who satisfy the access policy can receive the location information and identity information of friends/strangers.
Identity privacy. In PPLS, LSs should not have any knowledge of vehicles' identity-related information. Pseudo-identity is used when vehicles send update messages or queries. Thus, anonymity is achieved. Though threshold distances may leak identity information (indirectly) of vehicles to the adversary, homomorphic encryption is used to encrypt the sensitive data. Thus, vehicles' identity privacy is well preserved.
Location privacy. SNS may collude with dishonest vehicles and attempt to obtain the location information of a particular vehicle illegally. When receiving the registration/update messages from vehicles or receiving the responses from LSs, SNS has the chances to access vehicles' locations. PPLS encrypts vehicles' locations using asymmetric encryption, which protects location information from SNS.
Social network privacy. The privacy of the social network is preserved by two approaches, which are described as follows.
(1) When a vehicle requests for particular friends or friends/strangers within specific distances, SNS will divide the friends/strangers into random subsets and send these sets to different LSs. These subsets have different sizes and will be sent to LSs randomly. Furthermore, dummy vehicles can be added into the original set. As a result, each LS can only get part of the friend list with dummy vehicles. Since we assume that LS will not collude with each other, LSs are prevented from knowing vehicles' social networks.
(2) For each time period t, vehicles need to update their information. During this phase, SNS assigns each vehicle a new pseudo-identifier, which is different from the original one. As a result, after the time period t, for different queries from the same vehicle, the vehicle's pseudo-identifier and its friends' pseudo-identifiers become different. Therefore, it is impossible for LSs to determine the information of vehicles' social networks.
Experimental Evaluation
The proposed PPLS scheme uses a number of encryption and decryption steps. To evaluate the real time performance, we have conducted a number of experiments.
Implementation
In our system, three cryptography schemes are implemented: digital signature, asymmetric encryption, and homomorphic encryption. We use RSA [25] with 1024-bit key size for data encryption, RSA PKCS1-v1-5 for signature, and Paillier with 1024-bit key size for homomorphic encryption. Our simulation is implemented on an Intel Xeon E3-1230v3 running at 3.4 GHz with 8 GB 2133
GHz memory. We use Python 3.5.0 to implement the proposed algorithms.
Some PyPI packages are used in our cryptography schemes: pycrypto for signature, asymmetric encryption and phe for Paillier encryption.
In our experiments, vehicles can use many effective techniques to obtain locations, such as GPS. We assume that the threshold distance can set as 10, 20, . . . , 100 meters with steps of 10 meters or 100, 200, . . . , 1000 meters with steps of 100 meters. For friends, vehicles may consider choosing a smaller value as the threshold distance. For strangers, vehicles may choose a larger value as the threshold distance.
Evaluation
As the RSA signing technology used in the registration and update phases can be replaced by any other signing algorithms, we do not analyze the registration and updating phase. 
Related Works
In recent years, mobile computing has changed the future of communications and sevices [26, 27] , and accordingly promotes the rapid development of vehicular networks, VSNs have experienced an explosive development. Since a vehicle's location is important information used in VSNs, the issue of protecting vehicles' location privacy has received considerable attention. Until now, many studies on location privacy protection [28, 29] have been done, such as location anonymity, information hiding [30] and so on. Location anonymity is an effective technique for location privacy protection and there are two types of methods to achieve it: 1) K-anonymity: The fundamental premise is to mix the real user's location information into k − 1 other anonymous users' location information, which confuses the adversary. This approach is proposed in [31] by MobiShare [15] . Bloom Filter was used in this scheme to replace the private set intersection protocol in MobiShare+ and the time cost was reduced. However, B-MobiShare was less efficient than expected, the time cost was still high. In 2017, Li et al. proposed a system with enhanced privacy [19] , using multiple location servers to prevent insider attack launched by the service providers.
However, all the above mechanisms do not treat the threshold distance as sensitive data, and work with a single threshold distance for users to set for all of their friends, which is unrealistic in real social networks.
Conclusion
Privacy preservation of location sharing in VSNs is an important issue. In this article we propose PPLS, which protects vehicles' location privacy from SNS and preserves vehicles' social network privacy from LSs. The scheme allows vehicles to set different threshold distances for different friends, and to enjoy a more flexible access control policy. In order to implement this access control policy, a secure distance comparing protocol is presented. To permit vehicles sharing locations with friends, new queries are designed for particular friends.
The security analysis shows that PPLS is secure under a comprehensive security model. Moreover, the experimental evaluation demonstrates the efficiency of PPLS.
